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Writers on business strategy have traditionally distinguished between Strategy 
formulation, on one hand, and Strategy imolementation on the other, and this 
distinction is embodied in most text books on the subject, as well as in most 
executives’ perceptions of the strategic management process. Recent research into 
the process of strategic change has, however, established that while formulation and 
implementation activities may be conceptually distinct, they cannot be treated as 
practically independent. The traditional stage model of a process of strategy 
formulation being followed by a separate process of implementation does not in fact 
describe they way in which organizations work. This raises the question, from a 
process perspective, as to how the two types of activity may be characterized, and 
how they interact with each other. In this paper we shall draw on a recently 
developed framework for the analysis of strategic decision making as a political 
process to develop a characterization of strategy formulation in terms of the 
politics of inhibition, or unconscious constraints; and of strategy implementation in 
terms of the politics of non-cooperation, or conscious constraints. We shall then 
examine the consequences of looking at the strategic process as a whole as a 
dynamic created by the interaction of these two different sets of constraints. 
Focusing on new product development strategies in technology-based firms we shall 
look first at the ways in which the constraints complement each other so as to 
limit the scope for strategic change, and secondly at the ways in which they relate 
to each other over time so as to determine the pattern of strategic change. In 
conclusion we shall consider the implications of this analysis for strategy-makers. 
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A framework for snalvslq 
In a recent paper we drew on a body of 
in-depth research into the process of 
technological decision making at the 
strategic level to put forward a framework 
for the analysis of the strategic decision 
making process in organizations.’ 
Following Pettigrew, Pfeffer, Mintzberg 
and others, and adopting Pfeffer’s 
definition of organizational politics as 
“involv[ing] those activities taken within 
organizations to acquire, develop, and use 
power and other resources to obtain one’s 
preferred outcomes in a situation in which 
there is uncertainty or dissensus about 
choices”, we argued that the decision 
making process was essentially a process 
of organizational politics.2 It consisted 
primarily in a process of manoeuvreing and 
negotiation between individuals and 
interest groups, in which the wider 
interests of these individuals and groups 
and their overall power relationships were 
every bit as important as their views on 
the matter in question. 
To analyze this political process we 
classified its principal elements into 
elements of political context and elements 
of political activity, with the former group 
subdivided further into elements of 
preference and elements of relationship. 
Combining this framework, derived 
empirically from our analysis, with that 
developed by Pfeffer,3 we put forward a 
framework for the analysis of the political 
process reproduced here as figure 1. 
We also analyzed the sources of subjective 
preferences, and used this analysis to 
relate the political framework directly to 
the cognitive, cultural and group- 
psychological aspects of decision making 
explored by others.4 Apart from objective 
preferences derived exclusively from 
technical analysis and other shared 
preferences common to the organization we 
identified distinct personal, group, and 
departmental or divisional (more generally 
cultural) preferences, and analyzed the 
sources of these preferences in terms of 
cognitive, grow and cultural factors. 
Figure 2 presents a brief summary of our 
conclusions in this respect. 
Formulation and imDlementation in the 
stratecrv Drocesg 
In the context of the work outlined above, 
strategic decision making was treated as a 
process of continuous manoeuvreing and 
negotiating between interest grows, 
involving both the formulation and the 
implementation stages of the traditional 
strategy-making model. In this respect, the 
treatment was in line with much of the 
recent research into strategic decision 
making processes. Major studies by 
Pettigrew, Quinn, Mintzberg, Johnson and 
others have all highlighted the inadequacy 
of a simple stage model of strategy, in 
which the formulation and implementation 
stages can be sequentially separated.6 In 
particular both Quinn and Mintzberg have 
stressed that strategy formulation cannot 
generally be viewed as a separate process 
taking place at the top levels of the 
organization. Instead they see strategies 
(or in Quinn’s case successful strategies) 
as emerging from within the organization, 
their incremental emergence often going 
hand in hand with an incremental process 
of implementation planning, so that by the 
time a strategy is clearly formulated and 
adopted by the organization as a whole 
many of the problems of implementation 
may already have been resolved. 
The principal aim of this paper is to use 
the analytical framework outlined above to 
make some observations on the nature of 
this inter-relatedness of formulation and 
implementation activities within the overall 
strategy-making process. In order to do 
this, however, we must first focus on the 
distinction between the two types of 
activity. 
In terms of the framework outlined above, 
the process of strategy formulation 
involves preferences at all levels (personal, 
group, cultural and shared) and political 
tactics and strategies of all kinds. On the 
basis of the substantial historical and 
process studies of Hendry, Graham, 
Johnson, Janis and others, however, it 
would appear that the political aspects Of 
the process are largely unconscious.’ 
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Typically it would appear that each par- 
ticipant in the decision making process 
will genuinely seek an optimum decision, 
not in his own or his constituency’s 
interests but in those of the organization 
as a whole. His preferences will, however, 
unconsciously reflect those of his 
department or division, and of any smaller 
groups of which he is a member. They will 
also be conditioned by cognitive 
influences, and in particular, as Johnson 
has shown, by cognitive inhibitions, 
limiting and conditioning his responses to 
external stimuli.7 And the range of 
decisions effectively open to the group 
may be seriously inhibited, as Janis has 
shown, by the unconscious effects of 
“groupthink”. The decision makers will in 
general operate with any source of power 
and any political tactics available to them 
to ensure that a decision is reached in 
accordance with their own inhibitions. But 
research by Hambrick, Jemison, Narayonan 
and Fahey, and Nielsen and Rao has 
indicated, and the process studies confirm, 
that the most significant sources of power 
will be consensus and boundary control.Q 
Turning to strategy implementation, studies 
by Mumford, Pettigrew, Graham, Hendry, 
Greiner , Guth and Macmillan, and Quinn 
and Mueller all point to this also operating 
as a politics of constraints, but this time 
of conscious ones.” A decision having 
once been made, its political implications 
for the interests of the various individuals 
and groups become apparent, and attention 
is focussed on how to promote or retard 
it. As interest groups coalesce around the 
issue concerned, the cultural preferences 
associated with divisions or departments 
tend to dominate over personal or group 
preferences. And while all the sources of 
power and political tactics remain in play, 
the power derived from resource provision 
and from being irreplaceable, and the use 
of an effective power of veto or non- 
cooperation tend, as Hendry and Graham 
have shown, to come into prominence.” 
The process is overwhelmingly one of the 
politics of non-cooperation. 
ComDlementarv constraints and the scoue 
for strategic channq 
Putting the above observations together, 
we arrive at a picture of the overall 
strategic change process as a political 
process dominated by two sets of 
constraints: one, largely unconscious, 
acting on decision making, and another, 
largely conscious, acting on implementa- 
tion. The question then arises: how are 
these two sets of constraints related? 
Let us consider a simplified model of 
strategy formulation. A group of decision 
makers come together to formulate a 
strategy, each carrying with him his own 
set of inhibitions, sources of power, and 
tactical armoury. Some of the cognitive 
inhibitions, those arising from corporate, 
industry or national culture, and those 
arising from the group decision making 
process itself, will be shared, and these 
will determine the boundaries of possible 
strategy formulations. Where inhibitions 
are not shared, they may in principal be 
overcome through the political process, but 
assuming that, as is generally the case, a 
top priority is to reach a consensus 
decision, the likelihood is that even un- 
shared inhibitions will act effectively in 
limiting the range of strategies considered. 
So out of an infinite range of conceivable 
formulations we are left with a much 
smaller range comprised of those which do 
not seriously violate any of the decision 
makers’ inhibitions. Within this range, the 
eventual decision will then be determined 
by the tactical skills of the negotiators 
and, especially, by their sources of power. 
In the context of a technology-based firm 
debating new product strategies, for 
example, the key power source tends to lie 
with the marketing and finance functions 
(source of power = boundary control), 
whose preferences will generally prevail. 
Turning next to the implementation 
process, many of the shared inhibitions 
present in the formulation process will 
again be operative. Since not all those 
involved with the implementation will have 
been involved with the formulation and 
with the group effects inherent in that, 
the boundaries may well be slightly 
different, but assuming that the formula- 
tion process was carried out carefully the 
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difference should not be too significant. 
What will be significant, however, is the 
difference in power relationships. Looking 
again at the technology-based firm, the 
key power sources in implementation will 
tend to lie not with marketing and finance 
but with R&D and production (power 
sources = resource control and indispen- 
sability). Within the implementation process 
it is their preferences, maintained through 
the use of their effective powers of veto, 
that are likely to prevail. 
What all this suggests is that, in technol- 
ogy-based firms at least, there may well 
be a fundamental conflict between the 
constraints on formulation and those on 
implementation. This may not apply to 
every organization or every strategic 
decision process. But recent research 
suggests that the conflict between R&D 
and marketing, in particular, is still a 
dominant feature of most technology-based 
firms.12 Such firms would therefore seem 
quite likely to find themselves in a 
position where two rival interest groups 
were in effect dominating the two parts of 
the strategy process with potentially 
disastrous consequences: nothing that could 
be formulated would be likely to be 
implemented, and vice-versa. 
Strateev as a dvnamic of constraints 
So far we have treated only the statics of 
the formulation-implementation relation- 
ship, and that only cursorily. Restricting 
ourselves again, however, to the specific 
example of new product strategies, and 
drawing on the work of Graham and 
Hendry, we can also make some observa- 
tions upon the dynamic relationship 
between the two sets of constraints.13 
Graham studied the development of the 
videodisc at RCA, tracing both the top- 
level decision making as to what products 
RCA should be developing and offering for 
sale, and the development process itself, 
through a range of different projects and 
across several different divisions, for a 
period of about 15 years. The decision 
making process was dominated by a variety 
of competing images as to what sort of 
firm RCA was, some personal politics, the 
announcement of rival competitor 
offerings, and the hopes and often ill- 
informed aspirations of the marketing 
function. The development process was 
dominated by competition between 
different interest groups with the R&D 
function and within the relevant product 
divisions. It was eventually determined by 
a combination of astute political 
championing of one particular product 
design, and the non-cooperation of the 
critical product division with respect to 
certain key aspects of that design. The 
outcome was a series of strategy 
formulations and concept product launches 
which started out by bearing no 
relationship at all to what could in 
practice be implemented, but gradually 
converged towards it. 
Hendry studied the development of power- 
producing nuclear reactors by the United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority from its 
post-war beginnings to the establishment 
of a stable set of priorities (the AGR 
reactor as the basis for Britain’s nuclear 
power programme with the fast breeder 
reactor for use in the longer term) at the 
end of the 1950s. In this case both 
decision making and development were 
governed by much the same set of political 
forces, the most important of which were 
political blocking tactics and non- 
cooperation on the part of the division 
responsible for the final industrial-scale 
stages of development. As with RCA, 
however, the constraints on what could be 
implemented took a long time to emerge, 
in the course of which a series of 
practically non-implementable formulations 
were agreed upon. 
Hendry (1989) studied the development of 
the British computer industry over a 
period of twenty years, focussing on the 
formulation and implementation of new 
product strategies within the different 
companies concerned. The processes of 
both decision making and product 
development varied from firm to firm. 
Once again, however, the decisions appear 
in most cases to have emerged from a 
dynamic between what was perceived to be 
needed and what was in fact doable, with 
early decisions reflecting the former and 
later ones being dominated by the latter. 
In both these examples, the dynamic 
relationship between formulation and 
implementation was more or less the same. 
Original decision processes reflected very 
little of the realities of implementation, 
but as these emerged through the 
attempted enaction of the decisions, the 
latter were themselves conditioned 
increasingly by them. Eventually the 
constraints on the implementation process 
not only influenced but actually determined 
the formulation process: the organizations 
decided to do whatever it was they were 
going to do anyway. 
In this process the original strategy 
formulations acted as guides to the 
development process rather than as deter- 
minants of it. But like most guides they 
were characterized by guidelines, which is 
to say constraints. For while what is 
decided does not determine what is done, 
it cannot but limit it. What one gets, 
therefore, is a situation where the 
constraints of the implementation process 
are dominant, but the constraints of the 
formulation process also, to some extent, 
compound these. 
ImDlications for mananement 
Traditional approaches to strategy take the 
range of possible formulations as given, 
and take a resource approach to 
implementation, emphasizing the scope of 
what can in principle be implemented 
rather than the limitations of what might 
be implementable in practice. Our analysis 
suggests, however, that both aspects might 
profitably be reviewed. If the constraints 
on formulation are severe compared with 
those on implementation, important and 
perfectly feasible strategic opportunities 
might be lost. If the reverse is the case, 
the scope of strategic change will be 
limited, and if as is likely to be the case 
the decision makers are unaware of the 
situation, the costs that can be incurred in 
pursuing an unimplementable strategy can 
be enormous. As the examples given above 
indicate, an initially unimplementable 
strategy might in time be transformed into 
one that is implementable, but only at the 
cost of wasted development and, if the 
strategy is made public, of market 
credibility. Finally if the constraints on 
formulation and implementation are both 
severe, however well they might conform 
with each other, the resultant inability of 
the firm to change can place it in real 
danger. 
How, then, can you determine what your 
own firm’s constraints are, and what can 
you do about it if they do in fact pose a 
problem? The constraints on implementa- 
tion are usually there for all to see, if 
only you look. Most people do not look, 
for while they will recognize (if not 
openly admit to) an element of political 
manoeuvring in their own activities, they 
do not as a rule expect it in others. 
Moreover, if there is a substantial degree 
of conflict between two units of the 
organization, this conflict is usually less 
apparent to the politically dominant unit, 
which is the one likely to influence the 
decisions, than to the dominated one. 
Whereas the dominated unit will relate all 
its actions to the source of domination 
and so may have a very significant 
obstructing effect on the implementation 
process, the dominant unit will tend to 
take its domination for granted and ignore 
any problems that the rival unit might 
create. So the constraints are often not 
seen - but they are nevertheless highly 
visible. 
Constraints on the formulation process, 
being largely unconscious, are naturally 
much harder to recognise. If formulation 
is dominated by a single constituency in 
the organization, however, or by a tight 
coalition of interests, or if it takes place 
within any closed group, these must all be 
danger signs. 
The remedies, apart from the very difficult 
task of changing the political nature of 
the organization, would appear to lie with 
those procedures that open up the 
decision-making process and relate it 
directly to implementation. If, as advocated 
by Quinn and Mintzberg, strategic ideas 
are allowed to surface from the depths of 
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the organization and not just from a small 
planning group, this at least allows a wide 
range of ideas to be considered.” And if 
the development, selection and implemen- 
tation of the ideas is handled through a 
process such as that described by Quinn, 
Hayes or Bourgeois and Brodwin, in which 
understanding and commitment are built 
into the decision making process, and the 
political difficulties of implementation are 
openly recognised and managed, then the 
worst of the dangers should be avoided. 
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Political units 
Preferences 
Relationships 
Sources of power 
Figure 1 
Individuals Groups Divisions or 
departments 
Individual 
preferences 
Group 
preferences 
Cultural 
preferences 
Shared 
preferences 
Interpersonal Inter-group relationships 
relationships 
A 
Formal Informal 
(committee) relationships 
relationships 
Being irreplaceable 
Political skills 
Affecting decision premises 
etc 
Consensus 
Uncertainty coping 
Resource provision 
Control over boundaries 
Strategies and tactics Selective use of objective criteria 
Use of outside experts 
Controlling agenda 
Use of coalitions and external 
constituencies 
Cooptation 
Use of committees 
Use of effective power of veto or 
non-cooperation 
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Figure 2 
Elements of preference 
Personal preferences 
Group preferences 
Cultural preferences 
Shared preferences 
Sources of preference 
Social context of individual development. Education, 
training and work experiences. Established and reinforced 
through unconscious cognitive simplifying processes and 
interactions with archetypal elements of the subconscious. 
Personal values, goals and ambitions. 
Shared experiences. Bonds formed as part of group 
development process. Group needs for survival and 
prestige. 
Developments of group preferences. Transmitted to 
newcomers (themselves selected and self-selected in 
accordance with established norms) through leaders, 
customs, rites, myths etc, and through reinforcement of 
supporting arguments. 
Corporate, industry or national culture, transmitted and 
maintained as for cultural preferences 
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